Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium
研究了企业内部代理问题与外部搜索摩擦的相互作用，发现私人信息可能增强失业率对生产率变化的反应，且工资合同的激励强度与高生产率、低失业救济和高搜索摩擦正相关。
This paper analyses the interaction between internal agency problems within firms and external search frictions when workers have private information. We show that the allocation of resources is determined by a modified Hosios Rule. We then analyze the effect of changes in the macro economic variables on the wage contract and the unemployment rate. We find that private information may increase the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to changes in productivity. The incentive power of the wage contracts is positively related to high productivity, low unemployment benefits and high search frictions.