How Do Quasi‐Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk‐Taking?
研究了股票期权授予增加对CEO风险承担的影响，利用多年薪酬计划中的制度特征克服内生性，发现期权增加10%会导致股权波动率上升2.8%至4.2%，主要由杠杆增加驱动。
ABSTRACT We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk‐taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk‐averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multiyear compensation plans, which generate two distinct types of variation in the timing of when large increases in new at‐the‐money options are granted. We find that, given average grant levels during our sample period, a 10% increase in new options granted leads to a 2.8% to 4.2% increase in equity volatility. This increase in risk is driven largely by increased leverage.