A Non‐unitary Discount Rate Model
构建了一个代理人以不同贴现率贴现消费和闲暇效用的宏观经济模型，发现时间不一致性导致两种效率损失，并分析了储蓄补贴和消费税的福利效应，结论与标准模型不同。
We develop a simple macroeconomic model in which agents discount their utility from consumption and the utility from leisure at different rates. Under this setting, time‐inconsistency emerges for the preferences of agents. Moreover, the time‐inconsistency problem generates two types of inefficiencies: intratemporal and intertemporal. We examine the welfare effects of savings subsidy and consumption tax. The effects of taxation in our model are quite different from those in the standard model. If the discount rate for consumption is higher (lower) than that for leisure, today's self cares less (more) about the consumption of the future selves than the leisure of the future selves. Depressing (stimulating) the consumption of future selves improves the utility of today's self. Hence a positive (negative) consumption tax rate improves the utility level of all selves.