RESIDUAL WAGE DISPERSION WITH EFFICIENCY WAGES
在经典在职搜寻模型中引入偷懒问题，研究工资如何同时配置劳动供给和激励员工努力，推导出与经验数据一致的右偏峰形工资分布。
Abstract This article extends a classic on‐the‐job search model of homogeneous workers and firms by introducing a shirking problem. Workers choose their effort levels and search on the job. Firms elicit effort through wages and monitoring; an inverse relationship between wages and monitoring rates is derived. Wages play a dual role by allocating labor supply and motivating employee effort. This gives rise to an equilibrium wage distribution that contrasts with existing literature. In particular, I show that a hump‐shaped and positively skewed wage distribution, as observed empirically, can be derived even when firms and workers are, respectively, identical.