Macroprudential Policies in a Low Interest Rate Environment
研究了低利率环境下零利率下限约束带来的总需求外部性如何为宏观审慎干预创造额外空间，并分析了货币政策与宏观审慎政策协调的复杂性。
Abstract In this paper, we analyze the use of macroprudential policies in a low interest rate environment, where an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint gives rise to aggregate demand externalities. We study this issue by using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with financial frictions and a monetary policy rule that is subject to the ZLB. We find that, in a low interest rate environment, the occasionally binding ZLB creates additional scope for macroprudential intervention. When the interest rate is high and the two policies can perfectly coordinate, the optimal policy prescriptions behave as if they were independent. This is, however, no more the case, when the interest rate is low and/or when monetary policy and macroprudential policy cannot be perfectly coordinating. This more complex policy environment calls for more policy coordination.