Governing the innovation commons
运用制度经济学理论分析创新的早期阶段，指出创新公地作为公共池资源的治理结构，结合哈耶克、威廉姆森和奥斯特罗姆的理论，将创新问题视为知识、隐性契约和集体行动的综合治理问题。
Abstract This paper analyses the origin of innovation using institutional economic theory. Because of distributed information and fundamental uncertainty, an efficient institutional context for the economic organization of innovation in its early stages is often that of a common pool resource. The theory of the innovation commons draws upon Hayek, Williamson and Ostrom to present the innovation problem as a combined knowledge problem, implicit contracting problem and collective action governance problem. Innovation commons theory also implies that Kirzner's model of entrepreneurial opportunity discovery extends to higher-order groups, suggesting a multilevel selection model of economic evolution.