Competing Information Sources
研究了当交易者能从其他渠道获取额外信息时，公司向资本市场的自愿披露策略会如何改变，可能导致部分披露或选择性披露，甚至出现披露后股价折价的反常现象。
ABSTRACT This study analyzes corporate voluntary disclosures to the capital market in the presence of competing information sources, from which traders can subsequently obtain additional public and private information. The analysis demonstrates that the anticipated access of traders to additional information sources may significantly alter the voluntary disclosure strategy of firms. It may explain a deviation from the conventional full disclosure equilibrium to equilibrium with partial and selective disclosure. It may also lead to an untypical equilibrium shape, where any information content can be disclosed and can be withheld with a positive probability, and where the stock price reflects a pricing discount upon disclosure rather than in its absence. JEL Classifications: D82; G10; M41.