Effects of Minimum Bid Increments in Internet Auctions: Evidence from a Field Experiment
利用芬兰在线拍卖网站的田野实验数据，研究最低出价增量如何影响竞拍者行为，发现竞拍者会策略性压低出价，且增量越大压低越多。
I study the role of minimum bid increments (MBI) in internet auctions using natural field experiment data from a Finnish online auction site Huuto.net . Internet auctions are typically viewed as second‐price, implying truthful bidding. However, due to the presence of the MBI, equilibrium bidding behavior involves bid shading. I sell otherwise identical gift cards while varying the MBI and test between truthful bidding and bid shading. Truthful bidding is rejected. Consistently with equilibrium behavior, bid shading increases as the MBI increases. This implies that real‐world bidders are capable of reacting rationally even to seemingly small variations in their strategic environment.