Patent Hold‐Up and Antitrust: How A Well‐Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation
研究了标准必要专利的劫持问题，指出反垄断法中的损害赔偿救济虽能解决劫持，但会降低创新者许可收入，从而减少有益研发项目。
Licensing technology essential to a standard can present a hold‐up problem. After designing new products incorporating a standard, a manufacturer could be confronted by an innovator asserting patent rights to essential technology. This hold‐up problem can be solved with a damages remedy provided by antitrust or some other body of law, but a damages remedy can reduce the innovator's licensing revenue and thereby retard innovation. The availability of an ex post damages remedy also alters the licensing terms in ex ante bargaining with the result that fewer socially beneficial R&D projects are undertaken.