Firing the wrong workers: Financing constraints and labor misallocation
研究发现融资约束导致企业错误地解雇高未来预期生产率但任期短的工人，利用瑞典2000-2010年雇主-雇员匹配数据提供实证证据，对理解金融摩擦的劳动力错配效应有重要意义。
Firms consider wages, current and expected productivity as well as firing and hiring costs when firing a worker. Financing constraints distort this intertemporal trade-off, leading firms to sub-optimally fire short-tenured workers with high future expected productivity. We provide empirical evidence of this distortion using matched employer-employee data from the Swedish population between 2000 and 2010. We propose a new empirical strategy that uses credit ratings to identify financing constraints and uses exchange rates and trade data to identify demand shocks. Our empirical results identify an important new misallocation effect of financial frictions that operates within firms across different types of workers.