Optimistic Disclosure Tone and Conservative Debt Policy
研究发现管理者乐观语调会显著降低公司杠杆率，增加现金持有并减少股利支付，支持了乐观管理者因认为外部融资成本过高而采取保守债务政策的观点。
We examine the relationship between managerial optimism and debt conservatism (i.e., the low‐leverage puzzle). Our analysis demonstrates that optimistic tone, our time‐varying optimism measure, significantly decreases leverage. This evidence supports the proposition that optimistic managers who consider external financing as unduly costly use debt conservatively. This reduced reliance on external financing can be explained by further evidence that optimistic tone significantly increases cash holdings and decreases dividend payment. The negative tone–leverage relation is stronger in the presence of high insider purchase of own stocks, which confirms that optimistic tone reflects managerial optimism. This study suggests that managerial optimism can help explain the low‐leverage puzzle.