Optimal Dynamic Taxation with Distinctive Forms of Social Status Attainment
研究了消费和财富引发的社会比较如何影响动态最优所得税设计，发现完全信息下用劳动税和资本税分别纠正外部性，不完全信息下低生产率者边际劳动税率可能低于高生产率者，与传统模型结论相反。
Abstract We examine the role of both consumption‐ and wealth‐induced social comparisons in setting dynamic optimal income taxation. Under complete information, state‐invariant labor income taxes are used to remedy the externality caused by consumption‐induced social comparisons, while state‐contingent capital income taxes are used to remedy the externalities caused by both consumption‐ and wealth‐induced social comparisons. Under incomplete information, distinct types of agents are subject to an identical marginal capital income tax, which removes social comparisons. To solve the information problem, low‐productivity agents could be subject to a lower marginal labor tax than high‐productivity agents, which contradicts the traditional result in the Mirrlees–Stiglitz models.