Dynastic Political Rents? Economic Benefits to Relatives of Top Politicians
利用瑞典市政选举的激烈竞争，检验当选市长的亲属是否获得经济收益，发现市长子女收入上升约15%，但并非通过非法分配工作，而是推迟高等教育并留在父母所在市工作。
We exploit close elections in Swedish municipalities to test whether relatives of politicians who become mayors obtain economic benefits. We find no benefits for the siblings of new mayors, but the average earnings of children of newly appointed mayors rise by about 15%. Administrative information on occupational and residence status show that the higher earnings are unlikely reflect an illegitimate allocation of jobs. But the evidence suggests that children of election‐winning mayors are more likely to postpone tertiary education and remain in their parents’ municipality to work.