Do patents work? Thickets, trolls and antibiotic resistance
本文结合知识产权经济学理论，分析美国专利政策强化是否促进了创新，发现专利在复杂技术领域会阻碍后续研究，并探讨了专利流氓、专利丛林等问题，最后将分析应用于抗生素市场，提出改进激励的政策建议。
Abstract This paper connects ideas from recent literature on the economics of intellectual property (IP) to address the question: Did the strengthening and broadening of IP rights from important patent policy changes in the US promote greater innovation? The analysis rests on the theory of cumulative innovation, which shows that if IP rights on a pioneer invention extend to follow‐on research and impediments to contracting exist, then strengthening patents can actually reduce overall innovation. Recent empirical studies are consistent with the theory: patents can significantly deter follow‐on research in “complex” technology areas where contracting is difficult (computers, electronics, telecommunications) but not in drugs, chemicals and human genes. I outline remedies from court decisions and antitrust policy for addressing inefficiencies from patent trolling, patent thickets and the anti‐commons of fragmented ownership. I then apply the analysis to the antibiotics market, drawing on recent research, to examine how patent and competition policies can be used to improve incentives for drug development in the battle against antibiotic resistance. The literature provides persuasive evidence that the policy changes overreached in broadening and strengthening IP rights and reveals important patent reforms for improving the effectiveness of patent systems in the US and Canada.