Third-Party Intervention and the Preservation of Bargaining Relationships
利用纵向谈判合同数据，研究第三方争端解决程序（如调解、仲裁）是否有助于维护谈判关系，发现早期程序（调解）比后期程序更可能降低关系破裂风险，但未发现这些程序能促使后续协议更早自愿达成。
This article uses longitudinal bargaining contract data to examine whether third-party dispute resolution procedures improve the health of bargaining relationships and contribute to their preservation. The author uses survival analysis to assess whether the procedures correlate with the likelihood of relationship dissolution. This analysis shows that earlier procedures in the dispute resolution process, such as conciliation and mediation, are related to a lower likelihood of dissolution than are later ones. The author then uses dynamic panel models to consider whether third-party intervention pushes the parties to settle subsequent collective agreements voluntarily or earlier in the process, but he finds no evidence to this effect.