Director networks, turnover, and appointments
利用社会网络方法分析执行与非执行董事的劳动力市场，发现强网络帮助董事获取信息以更易离职寻找更好机会，并缓解外部任命的信息不对称问题。
Abstract This paper analyzes the labor market (turnover and appointments) of executive and non‐executive directors by means of social network methodology. We find that directors with strong networks are able to obtain labor market information that enables them to leave their firm more easily for better opportunities. Networks also mitigate information asymmetry problems of external director appointments. Furthermore, the strong impact of indirect connections is in line with the ‘strength of the weak ties’ theory. The fact that direct connections are less important signifies that the connections to people that are close and local are likely to convey redundant information, whereas connections to distant individuals are more efficient in terms of information acquisition and labor market performance improvement.