Centralized Decision Making and Informed Lobbying
研究了集中与分散决策在受知情游说影响时的权衡，发现当游说者偏好一致时集中决策能减少俘获并提高福利，偏好对立时则相反，并用地方公共品和关税同盟案例说明。
We address the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making subject to influence from privately informed lobbies. We focus on informative equilibria with separating differentiable contribution schedules and identify an information transmission effect under centralized structures. Such effect decreases capture and increases welfare when lobbies have “aligned preferences.” The opposite effect holds for “polarized preferences.” We present two examples of this framework: local public goods and customs union agreements. Finally, we compare the policy outcomes from this political economy perspective to those under a normative mechanism design approach, and extend our analysis to the discussion of pooling equilibria.