Index Fund Entry and Financial Product Market Competition
研究低成本指数基金进入如何影响基金公司策略，发现对自主投资者基金降费5%，但对经纪推荐基金提费6%，并减缓主动管理基金增长，揭示费用缓慢下降的原因。
The active money management industry is characterized by both strong competitive pressure from passive investment vehicles and high fees. This paper investigates how the introduction of low-cost index funds affects fund company strategies. The retail mutual fund market is segmented, where unsophisticated investors rely on financial advisers and sophisticated ones invest directly. Exploiting the staggered entry of low-cost Vanguard index funds as competitive shocks, I show that, in response to competition, incumbents sold to self-directed investors reduce their fees by 5% of the mean; however, funds sold with broker recommendations increase their fees by 6% of the mean. Index fund entry also slows the growth of actively managed funds. The responsiveness of broker-sold fund flows to distribution fees increases, suggesting a shift in composition toward less elastic consumers. Further, incumbents increase the degree of active management. The results illustrate why mutual fund fees slowly decline in the aggregate despite competition from lower-cost alternatives. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.