Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies
研究了买方在采购复杂商品时，初始设计可能存在未知缺陷的问题。设计了一个两阶段拍卖机制，激励卖方尽早报告缺陷，并将项目分配给成本最低的卖方，无需事先知道可能的缺陷集合。
A buyer who wants to procure a complex good is often aware that there may be flaws in her initial design, but she does not know what they look like. Potential sellers who discover flaws have no incentive to reveal them early if the buyer uses a price-only auction. We derive an efficient mechanism that induces all sellers to report flaws early and that allocates the project to the seller with the lowest cost. We show that this can be implemented with a simple two-stage auction that does not require any prior knowledge of the set of possible flaws. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.