The Legacy and the Tyranny of Time: Exit and Re‐Entry of Sovereigns to International Capital Markets
使用连续时间Weibull模型研究主权国家退出和重新进入国际资本市场的持续时间，发现债务人声誉随时间固化影响市场准入，短期退出享受债权人信任，长期退出则因坏名声而更难重返。
Abstract We use a continuous‐time Weibull model (without and) with a change‐point in duration dependence to investigate the duration of the exit and re‐entry of sovereigns to international markets. We find that, as the reputation of debtor countries as good (bad) borrowers solidifies over time, those episodes are more likely to end—the “legacy of time.” Debtor countries take advantage of the “benefit of doubt” of creditors during short exits. When exits are long and the reputation as a bad borrower emerges, no more “complacency” makes it more difficult to borrow again in international markets—the “tyranny of time.”