Targeting Interventions in Networks
研究网络如何传导策略性溢出和外部性，分析政策制定者如何最优地选择干预目标以改变个体的私人投资回报，发现最优干预在战略互补（替代）游戏中更侧重全局（局部）网络结构的主成分。
We study games in which a network mediates strategic spillovers and externalities among the players. How does a planner optimally target interventions that change individuals' private returns to investment? We analyze this question by decomposing any intervention into orthogonal principal components , which are determined by the network and are ordered according to their associated eigenvalues. There is a close connection between the nature of spillovers and the representation of various principal components in the optimal intervention. In games of strategic complements (substitutes), interventions place more weight on the top (bottom) principal components, which reflect more global (local) network structure. For large budgets, optimal interventions are simple—they essentially involve only a single principal component.