Self‐perpetuation of Political Power
利用阿根廷国会任期随机分配的自然实验，发现更长的众议院任期增加了晋升更高政治职位和亲属进入未来国会的概率，并指出知名度是政治王朝形成的机制。
I investigate the relationship between tenure length in the House and posterior political success. I exploit a natural experiment in the Argentine Congress – where terms length were assigned randomly after the return to democracy – that provides a source of exogenous variation to initial political power. I find that having a longer tenure in the House increases both the probability of moving to higher political positions and the probability of having a relative in future congresses. I also find that name recognition is a mechanism behind dynastic success. Finally, I report a negative correlation between being a dynastic legislator and political effort.