Willpower and compromise effect
为将意志力建模为有限认知资源提供了行为基础，并研究了面对有限意志力消费者的垄断者定价问题，发现最优合约常包含三个选项，且消费者选择内生出折中效应。
This paper provides a behavioral foundation for modeling willpower as a limited cognitive resource that bridges the standard utility maximization and Strotz models. Using the agent's ex ante preferences and ex post choices, we derive a representation that captures key behavioral traits of willpower‐constrained decision making. We use the model to study the pricing problem of a profit‐maximizing monopolist who faces consumers with limited willpower. We show that the optimal contract often consists of three alternatives and that the consumer's choices reflect a form of the “compromise effect,” which is induced endogenously.