Delegating performance evaluation
研究了当绩效由可能偏袒代理人的评审者评估时，委托人如何设计最优激励合同，发现竞赛合同能有效应对评审者的宽容偏差，并可通过有上限的全支付拍卖实现最优努力配置。
We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance is evaluated by a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal fixes a set of prizes to be allocated to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer's potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be uniquely implemented by an all‐pay auction with a cap. Our analysis has implications for various applications, such as the design of worker compensation or the allocation of research grants.