Joint advertising of complementary products sold through an independent retailer
研究两个制造商通过独立零售商销售互补产品时，联合广告与单独广告的盈利性，发现对称制造商可能不愿合作，但非对称情况下弱势方可促使强势方参与联合广告。
Two game-theoretic models are developed to study the profitability of joint advertising in a context where two manufacturers sell complementary products through an independent retailer and can either advertise separately or jointly. We find that it may not be in the interest of symmetric manufacturers to partner for advertising, especially when joint advertising is less effective than firms’ individual advertising and the degree of advertising complementarity between the two products is high. Conversely, the manufacturers prefer joint advertising to individual advertising programs even if its effectiveness is lower, but both the degrees of price and advertising complementarity are very large. Under these conditions, joint advertising is implemented at the expense of the retailer who suffers from the associated reduced demand for the two products. In such a context, the manufacturers’ advertising partnership mainly reduces advertising costs by mitigating double marginalisation in pricing. The extension to asymmetric manufacturers shows that the weaker manufacturer and the retailer can induce the stronger manufacturer to engage in joint advertising.