Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment
通过实验室实验，研究了信息水平、搜索成本和承诺程度对去中心化匹配市场中代理人行为和最终结果的影响，发现低信息水平不影响稳定性和效率，搜索成本有显著负面影响，承诺则轻微损害稳定性但提高效率。
Abstract In a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents’ behavior and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level does not affect the stability or the efficiency of the final outcome, although it boosts market activity, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on stability and on market activity. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome.