Do Reticent Managers Misreport Data during Firm Surveys? Cross-Checking Reticent Managers’ Answers with Other Information
通过尼日利亚的准实验，发现沉默的管理者在调查中报告更高工资，而工人报告更低或相同工资，表明他们可能误报敏感信息。
Previous studies have shown reticent managers answer sensitive questions differently than other managers do. If this is because they misreport information, it will be difficult to accurately estimate averages or regression coefficients. It is possible, however, they answer sensitive questions differently because their firms are different. This paper presents evidence from a quasi-experiment that suggests reticent managers misreport sensitive information. The paper first shows reticent managers in Nigeria report paying higher wages than other managers do. It then shows workers at these firms report lower, or similar, wages. The simplest explanation for this is that reticent managers misreport wages.