Market Making Contracts, Firm Value, and the IPO Decision
研究了二级市场流动性如何影响公司价值和IPO决策，发现竞争性做市在基本面不确定性和信息不对称较大时会导致福利下降和IPO受阻，而指定做市商合约能改善公司价值和福利。
ABSTRACT We examine the effects of secondary market liquidity on firm value and the IPO decision. Competitive aftermarket liquidity provision is associated with reduced welfare and a discounted secondary market price that can dissuade IPOs. The competitive market fails in particular for firms or at times when uncertainty regarding fundamental value and asymmetric information are large in combination. In these cases, firm value and welfare are improved by a contract where the firm engages a designated market maker to enhance liquidity. Such contracts represent a market solution to a market imperfection, particularly for small, growth firms.