What Happens If Private Accounting Information Becomes Public? Small Firms’ Access to Bank Debt
利用德国一项加强执法和罚款的监管改革作为准自然实验，研究发现私人会计信息强制公开后，小企业获得银行贷款的机会显著增加。
We examine the effect of private accounting information becoming public on small firms’ access to bank debt. Both proprietary cost of disclosure and relationship banking have contributed to German private firms’ traditional non-disclosure of financial statements. We employ a regulatory change, which increased enforcement and established severe fines for firms that do not publicly disclose financial statements, as a quasi-natural experiment. We find that small firms’ access to bank debt has significantly increased after the disclosure shock. With our study based on a novel dataset in a non-voluntary private firm setting, we contribute to the discussion on private and public information in debt contracting.