Common-Ownership Concentration and Corporate Conduct
本文梳理了共同所有权集中度影响企业行为的理论基础、实证证据和法律讨论，指出其对公司治理、战略、产业组织和金融经济学的广泛意义，并展望未来研究方向。
The question of whether and how partial common-ownership links between strategically interacting firms affect firm objectives and behavior has been the subject of theoretical inquiry for decades. Since then, the growth of intermediated asset management and consolidation in the asset management sector has led to more pronounced common-ownership links at the level at which corporate control is exercised. Recent empirical research has provided evidence consistent with the literature's prediction that common-ownership concentration (CoOCo) can affect product market outcomes. The resulting antitrust concerns have received worldwide attention. However, because CoOCo can change the objective function of a firm, the potential implications span all fields of economics that involve corporate conduct, including corporate governance, strategy, industrial organization, and financial economics. This article connects the papers establishing the theoretical foundations, reviews the empirical and legal literatures, and discusses challenges and opportunities for future research.