Believe, But Verify? The Effect of Market Structure on Corruption in Religious Organizations
这篇跨国研究分析了宗教组织腐败的原因，发现宗教团体间的竞争和国家对神职人员任命的监管能有效遏制腐败，而支持国教和限制市场进入的策略则效果不佳。
Summary This first cross‐country analysis of the causes of corruption in religious organizations provides evidence in support of policy recommendations by A dam S mith. He argued that clergy are best constrained by competition among religious groups. Their appointment and promotion should, however, be regulated by the state. Both factors are shown to confine corruption. In contrast, D avid H ume's approach of supporting state religion and limiting entry into the religious market is not a promising strategy for mitigating religious corruption. More generally, these results suggest that the private sector may indeed be shielded from sprawling corruption as long as markets are sufficiently competitive.