The Value of Control and the Costs of Illiquidity
通过构建大宗交易搜索模型，量化控制权价值、大股东流动性折价以及分散股东因流动性溢出效应遭受的折价，基于美国上市公司控制权交易数据估计。
ABSTRACT We develop a search model of block trades that values the illiquidity of controlling stakes. The model considers several dimensions of illiquidity. First, following a liquidity shock, the controlling blockholder is forced to sell, possibly to a less efficient acquirer. Second, this sale may occur at a fire sale price. Third, absent a liquidity shock, a trade occurs only if a potential buyer arrives. Using a structural estimation approach and U.S. data on trades of controlling blocks of public corporations, we estimate the value of control, blockholders' marketability discount, and dispersed shareholders' illiquidity‐spillover discount.