Advertising and attachment: exploiting loss aversion through prepurchase information
分析了当消费者具有预期损失厌恶且不确定产品匹配价值时，垄断者的最优广告策略。广告提供可验证的匹配信息，改变消费者参考点，从而影响支付意愿。研究发现最优广告策略会混合不同消费者类型，使部分消费者参与事前不利交易，不完整的信息广告具有说服效应，为要求垄断者在销售点及所有促销材料中披露重要产品特性的政策提供了依据。
Abstract We analyze a monopolist's optimal advertising strategy when consumers are expectation‐based loss‐averse and uncertain about their individual match value with the product. Advertising provides verifiable match value information. It modifies the consumers' reference point and hence their willingness to pay for the product. We show that the optimal advertising strategy pools different consumer types so that some consumers engage in ex ante unfavorable trade. Incomplete informative advertising thus has a persuasive effect. This provides a rationale for policies that force the monopolist to disclose important product characteristics, not only at the point of sale, but also in all promotional materials.