Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover
研究了当成长机会随机到来且需要更换管理层时，企业如何在道德风险下提供经理人激励，发现成长导致的更替限制了企业依赖递延薪酬的能力，导致更多的前置薪酬，且最优合同可能在业绩良好后保护经理人免于因成长而被解雇。
ABSTRACT We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when growth opportunities arrive stochastically and pursuing them requires a change in management. A trade‐off arises between the benefit of always having the “right” manager and the cost of incentive provision. The prospect of growth‐induced turnover limits the firm's ability to rely on deferred pay, resulting in more front‐loaded compensation. The optimal contract may insulate managers from the risk of growth‐induced dismissal after periods of good performance. The evidence for the United States broadly supports the model's predictions: Firms with better growth prospects experience higher CEO turnover and use more front‐loaded compensation.