Hedge Fund Regulation and Fund Governance: Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory Disclosure Rules
利用对冲基金监管的三次交替变化，研究强制披露规则是否减少基金错误报告，并发现监管通过促使基金改善内部治理（如更换审计师）来提高财务报告准确性。
ABSTRACT This paper uses three alternating changes in hedge fund regulation to study whether regulation reduces hedge funds’ misreporting, and, if so, why regulation is effective. Relative to public companies, hedge fund regulation is relatively light. Much of the regime is a “comply‐or‐explain” framework that allows funds to forego compliance with governance rules, providing that they disclose their lack of compliance. The results show that regulation reduces misreporting at hedge funds. Further analysis suggests that the disclosure requirements led funds to make changes in their internal governance, such as hiring or switching the fund's auditor, and that these changes induced funds to report their financial performance more accurately.