Patent privateering, litigation, and R&D incentives
研究生产型企业将专利卖给专利主张实体（PAEs）后，PAEs通过诉讼威胁收取更高许可费，这既增加专利进攻价值又降低防御价值，最终可能提升研发投入但减少行业利润。
Abstract We model “patent privateering”—whereby producing firms sell patents to Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), which then license them under the threat of litigation—in a bargaining game. PAEs can negotiate higher licensing fees than producing firms because they cannot be countersued for infringement. Privateering produces two countervailing effects: it increases the offensive value of patents, whereas it decreases their defensive value and lowers the aggregate surplus of producing firms. Embedding the bargaining game into a Research and Development (R&D) contest for multiple complementary technologies, we find that privateering may increase R&D investments, even as it induces more litigation threats and reduces industry profits.