COLLECTIVE REPUTATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION
通过构建动态模型，研究集体声誉如何影响统计歧视的持续性，发现即使群体成员能协调预期，初始声誉差的群体仍可能长期无法恢复声誉，导致歧视长期存在。
Abstract Economists have developed theoretical models identifying self‐fulfilling expectations as an important source of statistical discrimination practices. The static models dominating the literature, however, may leave the false impression that a bad equilibrium is as fragile as a “bubble” and can burst at any moment when expectations flip. By developing a dynamic version of the model, we clarify the limits of expectations‐related fragility. Even if group members can coordinate their expectations about future employer behavior, a group with a poor initial collective reputation may still be unable to recover its reputation, implying that the once‐developed discriminatory outcomes can be long‐standing.