On the redistributive power of pensions
研究养老金与所得税在代际模型中的效率与再分配权衡，发现养老金会迫使劳动者工作以满足终身绩效要求，而所得税通过养老金激励间接影响劳动供给，降低税收反而促进再分配并降低效率。
We study the tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution in a model with overlapping generations, extensive labor supply, and perfect financial markets. The government instruments are a pension scheme and a age-independent nonlinear income tax schedule. At the second-best optimum, the pension system constrains the agents’ labor supply behavior, forcing them to work to achieve a required lifetime performance. Income taxes affect labor supply directly, but also indirectly through pension incentives. The indirect effect of taxes counteracts the usual forces in the efficiency-redistribution tradeoff: through the interplay with the pension system , decreasing taxes induces redistribution and reduces productive efficiency.