Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points – an experimental investigation
通过实验比较群体与个体在焦点协调博弈中的行为，发现利益一致时群体更易选择突出选项并提高协调成功率，但利益冲突较大时群体优势减弱，且认知复杂度高时群体表现更优。
This paper reports an experimental investigation of Schelling's theory of focal points that compares group and individual behaviour. We find that, when players' interests are perfectly aligned, groups more often choose the salient option and achieve higher coordination success than individuals. However, in games with conflicts of interest, groups do not always perform better than individuals, especially when the degree of conflict is substantial. We also find that groups outperform individuals when identifying the solution to the coordination problem requires some level of cognitive sophistication. Finally, players that successfully identify the solution to this game also achieve greater coordination rates than other players in games with a low degree of conflict. This result raises the question of whether finding the focal point is more a matter of logic rather than imagination as Schelling argued.