Capacity, Willingness, and Sovereign Default Risk: Reassuring the Market in Times of Crisis
研究区分了行为体避免违约的能力和意愿，发现欧元区债务危机中欧洲层面的安抚努力比国家层面更有效，且国家努力在能力最弱的国家效果最差。
Abstract Preserving the trust of bond markets is crucial for the world's many indebted countries, but it is still unclear when and how national or international actors can contribute to this goal. We present a set of arguments addressing this question and test them on the case of the eurozone debt crisis. Distinguishing between actors' capacity and willingness to avoid defaults, we argue that the crisis was marked by a lack of capacity at the national level, and limited or uncertain willingness at the European level. Accordingly, we find that European‐level efforts to reassure markets had considerably stronger effects than similar efforts at the national level. Furthermore, national efforts appear to have mattered the least in countries with the least capacity. These findings are based on a comprehensive new dataset of political events and relevant news, and they hold across a number of robustness checks and placebo tests.