The Joint Effect of Audit Quality and Legal Regimes on the Use of Real Earnings Management: International Evidence
研究了22个国家的数据，发现法律体制强的国家中企业更多使用真实盈余管理，而四大审计师能减少这种行为，尤其在法律体制强的国家效果更明显。
ABSTRACT This study investigates whether and how a firm's real earnings management (REM) is influenced by the strength of a country's legal regime and the presence of a Big 4 auditor. In a cross‐country examination using data from 22 countries, we find that REM increases in countries with stronger legal regimes as firms switch from accrual‐based earnings management (AEM) to REM. The presence of a Big 4 auditor reduces REM (as well as AEM) and attenuates the positive relation between legal regime strength and REM. Our results suggest that higher‐quality auditors limit client firms’ use of REM, especially in countries with a strong legal regime.