The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match
研究了纽约市高中分配机制从非协调到协调的转变，发现协调分配减少了匹配失败，提升了学生福利，尤其对之前容易被行政分配的学生效果显著。
Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement.