Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture
研究发现MillerCoors合资企业成立后，其自身及主要竞争对手Anheuser-Busch的啤酒零售价格均突然上涨，且涨幅无法用纳什-伯特兰竞争解释，模拟显示价格比竞争情况下高6%-8%，加价幅度高17%-18%，暗示合资可能促进了价格协调。
We document abrupt increases in retail beer prices just after the consummation of the MillerCoors joint venture, both for MillerCoors and its major competitor, Anheuser‐Busch. Within the context of a differentiated‐products pricing model, we test and reject the hypothesis that the price increases can be explained by movement from one Nash–Bertrand equilibrium to another. Counterfactual simulations imply that prices after the joint venture are 6%–8% higher than they would have been with Nash–Bertrand competition, and that markups are 17%–18% higher. We relate the results to documentary evidence that the joint venture may have facilitated price coordination.