WORK INCENTIVES OF MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES AND THE ROLE OF ASSET TESTING
研究了在信息不对称环境下，资产审查如何影响医疗补助受益人的工作决策，发现23%的受益人为保持资格而不工作，而资产审查可近似实现基于生产力的最优福利分配。
Abstract Should asset testing be used in means‐tested programs? Focusing on Medicaid, we show that in the asymmetric information environment, there is a positive role for asset testing. Our tool is a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. We find that 23% of Medicaid enrollees do not work in order to be eligible. These distortions are costly: If Medicaid eligibility could be linked to (unobservable) productivity, this results in substantial welfare gains. We show that asset testing can achieve a similar outcome when asset limits are allowed to be different for workers and nonworkers.