Accounting Restatements and External Financing Choices*
研究发现，发生会计重述后，企业外部融资更依赖债务融资（尤其是私人债务），减少权益融资；信息问题严重的企业债务融资增加更明显，而及时更换CEO/CFO或解聘审计师的企业则相反。
There is little research on how accounting information quality affects a firm’s external financing choices. In this paper, we use the occurrence of accounting restatements as a proxy for the reduced credibility of accounting information and investigate how restatements affect a firm’s external financing choices. We find that for firms that obtain external financing after restatements, they rely more on debt financing, especially private debt financing, and less on equity financing. The increase in debt financing is more pronounced for firms with more severe information problems and less pronounced for firms with prompt CEO or CFO turnover and auditor dismissal. Our evidence indicates that accounting information quality affects capital providers’ resource allocation and that debt holders help alleviate information problems after accounting restatements.