NOMINAL SOVEREIGN DEBT
研究表明，仅凭声誉就能维持名义主权债务，这种债务面临违约和机会主义贬值的双重风险。名义债务结合反周期汇率政策，在市场不完善时比实际储蓄更能对冲冲击。该模型解释了新兴经济体发行名义主权债券以及政府同时借贷和储蓄的现象。
Abstract I show that reputation alone can sustain nominal sovereign debt, which is subject to both the risks of default and opportunistic devaluations. Nominal debt combined with a countercyclical exchange rate policy allows more hedging against shocks than real savings if markets are incomplete. Thus, the loss of either repayment or monetary reputation severely affects the government's ability to smooth consumption. The model offers a simple explanation for the Bulow and Rogoff critique, while simultaneously helping explain the issuance of nominal sovereign bonds by emerging economies. The model also helps explain why many governments borrow and save at the same time.