Cartel Attributes and Cartel Performance: The Impact of Trade Associations
利用1933年《国家工业复兴法》这一卡特尔政策实验，研究发现事先存在行业协会的行业在卡特尔化后更能成功实现合谋，表现为产量下降或价格上涨。
This paper employs a cartel policy experiment, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, to examine whether industries that have trade associations in place prior to cartelization were better able to attain collusive outcomes than otherwise. Trade associations could potentially help industries better formulate effective cartel rules and could help with monitoring. We find that industries with trade associations were more successful in achieving collusion–proxied by either reductions in industry output or increases in industry prices–than those without. In fact, industries without trade associations were generally unable to successfully collude under the NIRA.