ENTRY DETERRENCE AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
研究了航空公司间的代码共享（一种战略联盟）对潜在进入者市场进入的威慑作用，发现威慑效果取决于代码共享类型和潜在进入者身份，并量化了其对进入成本和概率的影响。
Researchers have written extensively on the impact that strategic alliances between airlines have on airfare, but little is known of the market entry deterrent impact of strategic alliances. Using a structural econometric model, this paper examines the market entry deterrent impact of codesharing, a form of strategic alliance, between incumbent carriers in domestic air travel markets. We find evidence of market entry deterrence, but deterrence impact depends on the specific type of codesharing between market incumbents as well as the identity of the potential entrant. We quantify the extent to which market incumbents' codesharing influences potential entrants' market entry cost and probability of market entry.