Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core
研究了匹配市场中工人与企业分散化议价能否实现有效市场出清，发现错配和延迟频繁发生，且延迟在纵向差异化市场中会自上而下内生出清。
This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentralized, and in Markov strategies. Workers and firms bargain with each other to determine who will be matched with whom and at what terms of trade. Once a worker-firm pair reach agreement, they exit the market. Alternative possible matches affect agents' bargaining positions. We ask under which conditions such markets clear efficiently and find that inefficiencies -- mismatch and delay -- feature frequently. Mismatch occurs whenever an agent's bargaining position is at risk of deteriorating. Delay occurs whenever agents expect their bargaining position to improve. Delay can be extensive and structured with vertically differentiated markets endogenously clearing from the top down.