SOCIAL INSURANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY
研究了累进税制提供的保险如何改善工人与职业的匹配，通过构建均衡动态分配模型，利用美国和德国微观数据估计，发现更高的收入不确定性解释了美国更高的流动性，而提高累进性会提升流动性并带来产出和福利收益。
Abstract This article studies how insurance from progressive taxation improves the matching of workers to occupations. We propose an equilibrium dynamic assignment model to illustrate how social insurance encourages mobility. Workers experiment to find their best occupational fit in a process filled with uncertainty. Risk aversion and limited earnings insurance induce workers to remain in unfitting occupations. We estimate the model using microdata from the United States and Germany. Higher earnings uncertainty explains the U.S. higher mobility rate. When workers in the United States enjoy Germany's higher progressivity, mobility rises. Output and welfare gains are large.